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Abstract. The article analyses the relation between two metaphors of memory: project and repository. 
These ancient metaphors in early modern philosophy describe memory as the origin of such a duration 
which is the foundation of autonomy of contemplating being. That description gives the opportunity 
to answer the questions: what is the necessity of memory, what is memorabilia (and why memory and 
mnemonical things are essentially the same), and what it means to remember “by heart”. The concept of 
duration, which is central for Bergson’s philosophy, has its roots in early modern thinking and is strongly 
connected with a special kind of memory machine: machine without movement.
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Memory as a Problem
Frances yates, who re-discovered the 
“dead” (in her own words) art of memory 
for european humanities, completes her 
research with leibniz. In Descartes’ works, 
just as well as in Leibniz’s, she finds, on the 
one hand, some traces or echoes of the vast 
tradition of memory places and images; on 
the other hand, she holds trustworthy those 
descriptions of memory as an ability one 
can find in Leibniz’s works.
First, memory as an object of think-
ing occupies a rather marginal place in 
the works of early modern age thinkers 
(maybe excluding locke). at any rate, it 
does not play any significant role in their 
metaphysical constructions. Memory is 
depicted as assumedly subordinate abil-
ity, which should be replaced, according 
to Descartes, or should be simply devel-
oped along with other abilities, according 
to leibniz.
Second, after the encompassing work 
had been done by rational psychology in 
18th–19th centuries, the concept of a fac-
ulty undergone some essential changes. 
Leibniz in his works thinks a “faculty” 
to be the part of soul that, while being an 
evidence of ontological status of simple 
substances, has nothing whatsoever to do 
with natural abilities or talents, which we 
habitually associate with faculties because 
of being quite well-read in psychological 
literature of all sorts. 
third, in the seventeenth century mem-
ory is described with the same metaphors 
the ancient authors used for it: impression, 
its depth, the strength of memory, and so 
on. Nevertheless, while aristotle had these 
metaphors followed by the representation 
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of body as the unity which is composed 
by the harmony of four liquids (blood, 
phlegm, bile, and black bile), pneumatol-
ogy of the seventeenth century is the phys-
ics of blood and animal spirits, which, in 
turn, are the substances that can hardly be 
talked about in such terms as trace (or im-
pression), its sustainability, and its limits. 
early modern philosophy, though, has 
thought the concept of memory through 
in a way which would be a mistake to in-
terpret as simply a development of a job 
done previously. that is why the modern 
concept of memory may be seen as an in-
teresting vista of investigation, if this con-
cept is taken not as a psychological faculty 
of living creatures, but as an ontological 
characteristic of creatures endowed with 
thought and perception. In order to make 
the first step of this investigation it is vital 
to analyze the metaphorical discourse on 
memory.
there are at least two basic metaphors 
in which we have always been involved 
to describe memory. We have to draw at-
tention to them because they themselves 
are assumed to be in a familiar everyday 
notation of remembering. two metaphors 
which, like Bacon’s idols, always predict 
our statements about memory and what is 
remembered, are as follows:
1. Memory is a project of remembering. 
This can be understood in this way: there is 
a natural memory, one that is “simple”, and 
there is also an artificial memory. Actually, 
this difference is always explained either 
through equipment or through fitness. It 
is usually overlooked that the reference 
to non-equipped memory is difficult. It is 
impossible to specify what is natural in the 
natural memory: on the one hand, no ad-
justment can be made to remember — it can 
only be a combination of pre-established 
rules. Combinatorics is different from the 
art of remembering, because, although it 
reminds something to someone, to deter-
mine what to remember, and for whom, is 
the work of the autonomous remembering 
subject. On the other hand — even when 
we “just” remember, this does not mean 
a lack of preparation, or simplicity, as an 
independence from the circumstances of 
the memory. there are lots of things that 
I “just remember”. However, these are 
themselves the result of my or anybody 
else’s efforts which have been repeatedly 
renewed. therefore, what I remember in 
the “natural” way is a result — hardly the 
final — of hard and skillful work. Even 
a detailed analysis cannot identify any-
thing natural or simple in any of the acts 
of memory1. The refusal of the “natural” 
does not give as much methodological ad-
vantages as easy metaphorical structure. 
The field that we seek to describe by this 
metaphor is, above all, the field of history 
of thought. “Memory is a project” empha-
sizes that the meaning is sought, that there 
is a tune, or mood, in which the work of 
memory is able to stumble upon something 
that already exists independently.
But there is also another metaphor, 
which is often used to describe memory.
2. Memory is the repository (container, 
warehouse, general kind of receptacle). the 
concept of memory-repository is presented 
as a notion of memory like an archive, as 
1  That “artificial” character of memory Casey calls 
a “thick” autonomy of memory in contrast to “thin” au-
tonomy of imagination. See: Casey 2000: 262.
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well as in the machine memory, when we 
measure the memory – whether by bytes or 
storage units — in general by some atoms 
of memory. It could be impressions, which 
should be reactivated when one refers to 
any form of memory, or the elements of 
order (as in the case of computer memory), 
or the efficient ordering of symbolic space, 
as in the case with mnemonic nota. to un-
derstand the nature of these elements, ap-
parently, is to always clarify the character 
of the repository. Memory in the history of 
philosophy has been repeatedly described 
as a store: here we should remember Pla-
tonic “waxen boards”, the Augustinian 
definition of memory as “the stomach of 
the soul”, or Hobbes’ understanding of 
memory as a repository of forces. How-
ever, outside the certainty of items, the 
metaphor of repository has lost all mean-
ing because memory is always turned to 
the genuine, to what is real, rather than as 
a metaphor for the entire store. Or as a re-
pository of information (which, in general, 
is the same thing) that has lost sight of the 
conditions under which the “coincidence 
formats” are possible. Memory does not 
store anything (although we often realize 
that it holds everything we don’t want), it 
holds only that which already contains the 
key to understanding memory.
thus, both these metaphors are only 
metaphors. Describing various aspects of 
the invention of memory, they do not have 
conceptual content; they only describe 
the possible understanding. But a pos-
sibility is a possibility of the perfected. 
and to demonstrate the validity of these 
metaphors is to write a unique history of 
philosophy.
actually, why do we speak about two 
metaphors, if one of them refers to the past, 
and the other – to the future? and here the 
answer is obvious: speaking about memory, 
we would like to postpone the aristotelian 
answer to the question of whether memory 
is of the past, while contemplation is of the 
present. to delay the answer is to indicate 
to the aforementioned fact: in memory we 
belong to certain duration, and we also 
know that there are several kinds of dura-
tion. this multiplicity should be described 
not in terms of “before and now”, but in 
terms of closeness and distance, vague 
and definite. The usage of that metaphor 
is to back us away from the opposition be-
tween time and eternity: if memory does 
not explicate itself in time, then the art of 
memory leads us not to the “continuous 
present” but to the proximity that we find 
in a memory already fulfilled –. memory 
exists as autonomy, but depends on loca-
tion, image, and mood.
aristotle, using the metaphor of mem-
ory as storage, speaks of the “movement 
change” – this change is “stored”. Stored 
reproduces the very movement by which 
a trace (eikon) was left, that’s why, when 
somebody remembers a certain image 
(trace), one remembers something which 
differs from the image. remembering im-
printing (“second” type of motion), one is 
reminded of the seal ring motion, of the 
first movement. Therefore remembering 
(anamnesis) is like a syllogism, according 
to Aristotle: it finds the middle, the change 
of movement. However, in early modern 
philosophy, first of all, in Hobbes and Des-
cartes, the variety of movements is reduced 
to one: every movement is displacement, 
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therefore, a metaphor of memory-trace is 
excommunicated from the middle and, it 
seems, has to disappear as senseless. then 
why does this metaphor for memory re-
main stable? Memory as the trace of pow-
ers in Hobbes, locke’s notion of tabula 
rasa, the distinction between impressions 
and ideas in Hume are for that old meta-
phor of storage-print. the intention of im-
provement of memory as a special mental 
ability in Descartes and leibniz (we think 
here about his characteristica universalis) 
extends another metaphor of memory – 
project.
Is this adherence just the inertia of an 
academic word usage, or, since the point 
is the key concept of modern philosophy, 
there is the alteration in the very condi-
tions of reading of the metaphors? What is 
the element in modern philosophy which 
keeps the ancient system of metaphorical 
descriptions of memory still alive?
When someone remembers something, 
one understands what memory is. this 
understanding presents itself even if one 
can’t remember something (that is why we 
should think of oblivion as part of memory 
in concordance with augustinian descrip-
tion2). It is easy to describe memory; to 
give an exact definition. This ease of ex-
planation is amazing, but what exactly is 
our memory? Can different sorts or kinds 
of memory be identified? While “just re-
membering” in our everyday life, we never 
ask these questions. This “simplicity” of 
memory is the problem.
Regardless of simplicity, in every defi-
nition we could find in dictionaries or give 
2  On oblivion as part of memory see augustine 
1981: liber 10; Ricoeur 2004: 96-101.
by ourselves, we encounter the fact that 
memory has some technical equipment. 
Moreover, we receive certain pleasure 
from the hard work that goes into remem-
bering on that equipment. this pleasure 
increases our willingness to put forth the 
necessary effort to accomplish rote memo-
rization, rather than remembering by heart, 
or even “by life” and that willingness to 
lose ourselves and trust autonomous and 
impersonal agents is what is usually de-
manded.
Delivering memory to memorabilia, 
we deliver rather our accomplished notion 
of memory then the memory “itself”. Of 
course, there is no such a process as “de-
livering someone’s memory”, but when we 
ask somebody or something (e.g., a gadget) 
to remind us about future or past events, 
we have already engaged in an interpretive 
kind of memory and we should care for the 
given memory that corresponds with it. 
Thus, the question “what is the of simplic-
ity memory” contains three questions: (1) 
what is the necessity of memory, (2) what 
is memorabilia, and (3) what is “pure” 
memory or the kind of memory which we 
have simply, by ourselves, forever.
Historically, the third question is the 
question of the relationship between natu-
ral and artificial memory or, more psycho-
logically, between abilities (facultates) and 
development. But to divide memory into 
natural (or natal) and artificial is to forget 
how much effort was spent just to keep 
something in memory, to remember simple 
things, like the number of an apartment or 
father’s name. the skill of remembering 
something forever can be the sign of pride 
or horror, but in any case an accomplished 
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memory is a product of intensive work, 
time, and effort, spent on memorization. 
to be proud of a memory is to be proud of 
the hard, or even terrible, work involved. 
That work produces an effect: when we re-
member something, changes occur in the 
world. Memory, thus, is the most profitable 
of currencies: memorizing takes finite ef-
forts, but memory lasts an indeterminately 
long period.
Memory constructs the duration of 
things revealing them as items nearest to 
memory’s factory and – in that sense – just 
as perfect. Memory is involved in perfec-
tion, but it is not the principle of perfec-
tion. We know that memory can betray us 
and that the saying “he is lying like awit-
ness” is true. That is why we cannot fol-
low Descartes — from perfection to the 
perfect subject. We can’t trust memory 
even it is perfect: it has no self-evident 
structure of truth, in contrast to cogito. to 
be proud of memory is to be proud of that 
power which exists besides us, the power 
that changes the entire world when one re-
members something forever. this power, 
which takes place in other way than the 
power to remember something, is a sign 
of the necessity of memory; it allows us to 
differentiate between what we have a real 
reason to remember from the merely acci-
dental. What goes on when we remember 
something well, goes beyond and besides 
direct efforts to remember. It is just a satel-
lite of an accomplished memory. Being in-
volved in it, we are not consciously in the 
process, but – in obligation: I remember, 
therefore… and since we cannot choose 
the exact duration for ourselves, we often 
don’t remember exactly what we want.
Memoria and Duration
In the works of early modern thinkers we 
can find the word for that power: dura-
tion (duratio). this word will become the 
term later, in Bergson’s works3. Descartes, 
leibniz and Spinoza uses it as well-known, 
but rather obscure point: duration is some-
thing, which is becomes a time. Since time 
is the measure of movement, so time is 
relevant only for res extensa, thus duration 
as memory’s specification is beyond any 
movement.
The first change we encounter when 
dealing with an accomplished memory is 
the very notion of what memory is. that 
is why in order to answer the second ques-
tion we have to point out that memora-
bilia is not the determination of ability to 
remember, but rather it explains (already) 
performed mnemonic schema. thus mem-
orabilia or we should call it memory ma-
chines — inasmuch as machine is not just 
a tool but has certain autonomy — is the 
only evidence of the right way to perceive 
what memory is. Hence duration is a mo-
tionless machine.
When we think about memory it doesn’t 
make sense to ask what is primary – cor-
poreal things or anamnesis addressed to 
them. as memorabilia do not exist without 
mnemonist, so mnemonist discloses itself 
in corporeal similitude. the memory ma-
chine by its extension is an intension of 
productive efforts of memory. and vice 
versa: intension of memory, as long as 
it proceeds, is how we create the actual 
3  the notion Durée has its own history in Berg-
son’s evolution. Here I mean the first intuition of du-
ration as “true succession”, which was introduced in 
Bergson 1910: 100–104.
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memory or “memorabilia”. Memorabilia 
indeed reminds us of something, insofar 
as we should invent them and reveal how 
they are produced. to give something 
for memory is to explain what memory 
is about. the effort of memorizing is a 
mere trifle, which makes the repetition of 
memory easier, and the dichotomy of in-
tensive/extensive effort that we are faced 
with refers to the point in which personal 
memory disperses with its duration. Dura-
tion can be grasped in the concept of “col-
lective memories” (Halbwachs 1950), in 
the descriptions of structures of everyday 
life and in the essays on history of sen-
suality (Foucault, Hatton 1993). But it is 
essential just to mark the convergence of 
intension we deal with when we are fix-
ing: “I remember” or “I keep in mind” and 
extension — that set of corporeal things 
(including the human body) which gives 
the tension to the memory.
the invention of memorabilia should 
be reproduced and this reproduction is 
addressing a sphere of memories (places, 
images, etc.) that cannot differ from the 
mnemonist, a sphere, in which mnemonist 
can recognize himself. this reproduction-
recognizing has its own history and reveals 
the variety of circumstances, on which 
Leibniz wrote: “Thus it all often comes 
down to circumstances, which form a part 
of the combination of things. there are 
countless examples of small circumstances 
serving to convert or to pervert” (Leibniz 
1996: 178). Such a set of circumstances 
which transforms the circumstances them-
selves creates a specially marked place of 
memory. thinking about places of mem-
ory, we answer the first part of the ques-
tion, what the necessity of memory is. the 
necessity of memory discloses itself in 
memory places where we, being involved 
in memory, experience the memory as 
gratitude.
Memory, therefore, has its own histo-
ry. Contraposition of memory and history 
has already become a common place4. 
Memory possesses that intimacy which 
we would not usually find in history. His-
tory is the places of others, but memory 
is always personal. History deals with 
past time, while memory, being based on 
what is close, originates in duration. In 
this sense memory takes precedence over 
history: memory reveals the perfect, be-
cause memory is always an accomplished 
memory, whereas history is in the past, 
which is, as aristotle points out, a lack 
of present. Duration overcomes the set of 
moments.
the relation between memory and his-
tory, thus, is intermediated by intimacy 
and generated by pretension on autonomy. 
Memory explicates itself in the self-depen-
dence of evidence: if I remember correctly, 
and it is only my own recollection, but his-
torical data has no autonomy: it is submit-
ted to the order of material, of classifica-
tion, to the collection’s strategy etc. as a 
researcher, I would rather trust historical 
data than evidencies, or corporeal traces 
than promises of sincerity. I can check his-
torical data – and this check is a sign of 
non-autonomy, of dependence. thus, the 
question on memory is: what is evidence 
and what is the autonomy of evidence?
4  On the role of this distinction for historical sci-
ence see Wood 1994: 123–150; Hutton 1993: 147–154; 
Halbwachs 1950; Bevan 2006.
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today there is a lot of research on 
memory. the abundance of trying to un-
derstand what memory is clearly demon-
strates the lack of understanding. the lack 
is not felt in the forms of memory. On the 
contrary, it is possible that memory today 
is equipped so well and is more varied 
than ever before. Fundamental memory 
expansion projects are numerous and their 
achievements surpass imagination: numer-
ous internet projects involve people from 
all over the world; an abundance of muse-
ums where memory – every memory, in-
cluding the poorly understood ones – finds 
its place in any number of places; histori-
cal and political archives, various and ever 
more intensive methods of education, and 
so on. this many attempts to detect mem-
ory should put us on guard. Memory is 
inconceivable without its artificial master-
pieces, but if the art becomes a matter of 
design solutions and does not keep the inti-
macy, when any event is no longer stored, 
but reproduced, then memory’s claim to 
autonomy seems disingenuous5. If life and 
its richness is the ability to specify a limit 
of the true, then the forgotten in any mne-
monic project, which could be based on 
the intensity of feelings, is what is an ad-
dition to memory, although it happens due 
to “remember well”: the duration. Looking 
for life, one flocking after the bright mo-
ments, but the duration does not consist of 
the moments.
5  As pointed out by Heidegger, “a third, equally es-
sential phenomenon of modernity lies in the process of 
art’s moving into the purview of aesthetics. this means 
the artwork becomes an object of experience (Erlebens) 
and consequently is considered to be an expression of 
human life”. Heidegger, 2002: 57.
Memory, as based on aesthetic assimi-
lation of space, is also dependent on the 
concept of humanism. as a consequence, 
it has become shorter, and is manifest in 
various forms. Memory is not so lacking 
that something is missing, on the contrary, 
memory, built in a set of information and 
competencies, is available in abundance. 
Places of memory strongly demonstrate 
the need for a qualified assessment and 
grow systematically in an attempt to im-
prove the quality of life. techniques of 
remembering, as well as memorabilia, are 
not related to each other directly in an un-
derstandable way. they can be generally 
unrelated, because they are perceived out-
side sensuous sequences. Being involved 
in the need to remember, we can allow our-
selves to forget the connection of things. 
Memory, losing the distinctiveness of con-
nection, ceases to be an intelligible thing. 
Memory itself is insufficient. It should be 
supplemented by “active mode of living” 
or even by will to memory. Both, howev-
er, are the signs of the lack of memory. If 
yates (1966) describes the tradition of ar-
tificial memory as contamination of mem-
ory and loci, then contemporary modes of 
intertwining consciousness with places we 
should describe rather as oblivion. as Paul 
Connerton writes: “We live our lives at 
great speed; cities have become so enor-
mous that they are unmemorable; con-
sumerism has become disconnected from 
the labour process; urban architecture has 
a short lifespan; and social relationships 
are less clearly defined – all of which 
has eroded the foundations on which we 
build and share our memories” (Connerton 
2009: viii).
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It would seem there is an unfailing 
remedy, which we can find in St. Augus-
tine6: if you violate measure, literary for-
get yourself, i.e., have become spread in 
different places, you should recollect your-
self inasmuch as memory is the universal 
way of search. But everyone who is trying 
to make a clear way for himself, faces the 
fact that it is memory which challenges the 
intelligible mode of life. a loss of the cen-
ter, around which would meet the events 
and their subsequent understanding results 
in the need to remember more and more.
Such a loss, however, is not a unique 
feature of “our” (or any) time at all. Any 
relation to memory or time is problematic. 
Because at any time and any moment, no 
matter how homogeneous it may appear to 
jealous descendants or fill them with hope, 
Hamlet’s exclamation “the time is out of 
joint” is fair. On the contrary, the growth 
of machine-oriented memory forces us to 
rethink the relation of memory to global 
and universal places. Possession of in-
formation does not add the autonomy to 
a subject. On the contrary, a witness, the 
sole carrier of memory, is replaced by data 
warehouses which refer to another form 
of mind rather than autonomy. locke’s 
concept of “identity” is, as pointed out by 
Ricoeur (2004: 106), nothing but memory. 
But this is special memory, presented not 
by evidence, but by documents.
In other words, the person in a usual 
modern sense is produced not by mem-
ory, but rather by history, and that is ex-
actly what has neither the autonomy nor 
the duration. Personality is formed by the 
6  On the collecting power of memory see: Confes-
sions, X, 18.
passage of time and is defined as the one 
whose time has passed. Because identity 
is derived from an objective evidence of 
the time, it is something external to the du-
ration, which is connected with memory. 
locke wrote that memory makes the iden-
tity7. If we realize that duration is both es-
sential for memory, not for history, and du-
ration is beyond movement and time, then 
we should add – to get identity is to forget 
the self.
To Produce and Locate
“We are unjustly forgotten about...”, “we 
must remember on...”, “we must not forget 
that...”, “eternal memory to...” – all these 
appeals, periodically renewable, show that 
enumerated in them are elements that need 
attention. Memory today is a fair distri-
bution of attention (however it would be 
expressed — in financial investments, in 
honor or Citation Index). this distribution, 
in its own turn, has become a political or 
economical instrument. and this distribu-
tion destroys the notion of memory, be-
cause it treats the memory as something 
to be grasped. It is concerned with what 
is produced and does not concern itself 
with the production of memory. Indeed, 
for each living memory it is important 
to interpret elements of the memory ma-
chine. Interpretation is the discovery of the 
intimate, immediate features, all of which 
are uncomfortable in public places. So the 
thing to remember is that there is always a 
risk, and that this is a venture rather than 
an enterprise.
7  On locke’s conception of memory see ricoeur, 
2004: 102-108, where Ricoeur analyses the famous 27th 
chapter of “An Essay” (see Locke 1999: 311–332).
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there is another side to the risk of 
memory. the circumstances of memoriz-
ing may not have anything to do with the 
character of memory, or with its content. 
So, although I do not remember the cir-
cumstances which forced me to remember 
my name, I can remember it, or how I’ve 
learnt to translate the words of a foreign 
language. However, what we remember is 
binding, and memory increases our pres-
ence: to remember the Boston Tea Party 
is not the same as to commemorate the 
Battle of thermopylae. and now we are 
in a peculiar situation: while nothing is 
understood about why we remember, we 
have already invested some effort. this 
peculiarity, again, is akin to the adventure 
story: if I demand a memory before it was 
realized, then I myself am not at liberty to 
dispose my own memory. It would seem 
that the memory should shape my identity. 
Delving into my own memory and looking 
at its fathomless pit, I am deprived of any 
hope for identity. Is it possible to escape 
from this labyrinth of non-autonomy? Do 
we really need to get back on our feet again, 
or will we have the courage to remember 
ourselves, memento aude! We need to take 
this risk, this absence of well-founded 
senses to get even a hint at what memory 
is. Obviously, the answer to this cannot be 
found without going into an analysis of the 
nature of memory and the nature of the di-
versity of techniques or machinery through 
which memory is gaining strength.
In the early modern philosophy, tra-
ditional distinction between artificial and 
natural memory ceases to play a crucial 
role in the understanding both the nature 
of memory and in the descriptions of the 
ways of memory improvement. the nature 
of memory for Hobbes8, locke, Descartes, 
and leibniz is the rational order. Hence to 
improve memory is to reflect on instru-
ments of thinking. as soon as the nearest 
mode of definition of thinking is in force, 
memory-depository becomes the deposi-
tory of forces and power. Best way to re-
veal the power of ratio is to conceive and 
to fulfill the project. This is the way to 
distinguish memory from history. Concept 
of duration, which is central for Bergson’s 
philosophy, has its roots in early modern 
thinking. Multiple forms of duration are 
crucial to understanding the past. Both his-
tory and memory depends on such modes 
of cultural reflection as economics, poli-
tics, city architecture, ecology, and so on. 
Forms of memory are actively identified in 
terms of memory machines, while memory 
in the unlimited dynamic universe, the no-
tion of which was produced by early mod-
ern philosophy, has not its own language.
So, summing up, memory, as it is de-
scribed in early modern philosophy, is the 
memory written in a language of machines. 
Mechanical character of Modern age is not 
a discovery of something altogether new 
and not-ever-heard-before. It is an attempt to 
apply the rationalistic tools for understand-
ing duration that were created by means of 
scholastic language. that is why we, who 
inhabit digital universe, are all heirs to the 
event of this description. Working out the 
scholastic instruments of this description, 
along with being a site of historical-philo-
sophical investigation, also turns out to be 
the task for actual philosophy.
8  On Hobbes’ notion of memory see Малышкин 
2011: 101–125.
45
Santrauka. Straipsnyje analizuojamas dviejų atminties metaforų – projekto ir talpyklos – santykis. Šios 
senos metaforos ankstyvoje moderniojoje filosofijoje nusako atmintį kaip kontempliuojančios būtybės auto-
nomijos pagrindą sudarančios trukmės šaltinį. Toks aprašymas suteikia galimybę atsakyti į klausimus – kokia 
yra atminties būtinybė, kas yra atmintini daiktai (ir kodėl atmintis iš esmės yra tas pats kas mnemoniniai da-
lykai) ir ką reiškia išmokti mintinai. Trukmės sąvoka, centrinė Bergsono filosofijoje, yra kilusi iš ankstyvojo 
moderniojo mąstymo ir glaudžiai susijusi ypatingos rūšies atminties mašina – statiška mašina.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: atmintis, trukmė, atminties ir istorijos priešprieša, atminties mašinos.
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